In this work, we study how Tencent implements image filtering on WeChat. We found that Tencent implements realtime, automatic censorship of chat images on WeChat based on what text is in an image and based on an image’s visual similarity to those on a blacklist. Tencent facilitat … | Continue reading
The report includes technical elements associated with stalkerware applications, marketing activities, and compliance with Canadian privacy legislation. | Continue reading
Using Endless Mayfly as an illustration, this highlights the challenges of investigating & addressing disinformation from research & policy perspectives. | Continue reading
A new paper by the Citizen Lab investigates how Chinese censorship reaches independent developers and reveals that, while developers include censorship lists in open source projects, there is little apparent similarity in these blacklists, raising several questions about their or … | Continue reading
An investigation revealing that Mexican soda tax supporters were targeted with NSO Group's government-exclusive spyware and exploit framework. | Continue reading
Ahmed Mansoor was targeted by NSO Group, an Israel-based “cyber war” company that sells Pegasus, a government-exclusive “lawful intercept” spyware product. | Continue reading
In this post, we develop new Internet scanning techniques to identify 45 countries in which operators of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware may be conducting operations. | Continue reading
This report analyzes the information control practices related to a national crackdown on Chinese rights lawyers and activists on two leading Chinese social media networks. We document the Search filtering on Weibo, China’s Twitter-like service, as well as keyword and image censo … | Continue reading